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REFLECTIONS ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE TASK FORCE TO MODERNIZE SECURITIES
LEGISLATION IN CANADA: A RETAIL
INVESTOR PERSPECTIVE
Paul Halpern and Poonam Puri*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2005, the Investment Dealers Association of Canada funded a
task force to review and recommend changes in securities legislation
in order to promote more effective Canadian capital markets. An
important factor motivating the establishment of the Task Force was
the observation in the academic literature that Canada had a higher
cost of capital than other countries after accounting for risk. This
"Canada Discount" meant that Canadian companies had to pay
more for capital, and thus investment decisions were negatively
affected. The issue that the Task Force was interested in pursuing was
the extent to which changes in regulation could reduce or eliminate
the discount, or even shift the situation to a "Canada Premium."
The Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada
deliberated until October 2006 when the report and
recommendations were released.' Integral to the Task Force's
deliberations was the funded research undertaken by academics
and to a lesser extent, practitioners, from around the world. There
were 30 research papers prepared on a range of topics. The final 65
recommendations were informed by this research. However, not all
of the research topics were addressed in the recommendations. This
research effort was unprecedented in Canada.
Fundamental to the Task Force's deliberations was the trade-off
* Paul Halpern is Professor and TSX Chair, Rotman School of Management,
University of Toronto; Director, Capital Markets Institute. Poonam Puri is
Associate Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University; Head
of Research and Policy, Capital Markets Institute. This paper is current to events
as of December 1, 2007. This is a revised version of a paper presented at the 37th
Annual Workshop on Commercial and Consumer Law held at the Faculty of
law, University of Toronto, on October 19-20, 2007.
1. Canada Steps Up: The Report of the Task Force to Modernize Securities
Legislation in Canada (Toronto, 2006), available online: <www.tfmsl.ca > (The
Report).
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between using markets to discipline the capital markets and requiring
specific legal rules to protect investors. The former is more effective in
a situation where investors are well informed and is beneficial to
issuers (and ultimately shareholders) in terms of reducing costs and
speeding access to markets. The latter approach is more costly to
issuers and to market operations but reduces the costs to uninformed
investors, the bulk of whom are retail investors. The Task Force was
very sensitive to the role of the retail investor in capital markets but
also was concerned about the costs that their protection imposed on
the functioning of capital markets.
For this paper, we were asked by the conference organizers to focus
on the retail investor. This mandate forced us to make some difficult
choices regarding topics to include and exclude. For example, there
was a lengthy and imgortant discussion of Principal Protected Notes
(PPNS) in The Report. We do not discuss PPNS in this paper. There are
a number of other important issues that were discussed by the Task
Force that we are similarly unable to consider. We decided to
concentrate on certain fundamental areas for retail investors and for
capital market performance and regulation. Our focus is on four
areas. Part II of the paper considers enforcement, which has an
impact on the operation and opinion of both local and foreign
investors on the effectiveness of our market; Part III reviews the
debate on rules versus principles in securities regulation. Part IV
discusses financial literacy and its implications for disclosure; Part V
reflects on the influence and regulation of closely held companies,
specifically dual class and pyramid structures. This article reviews
and comments on some of the recommendations of the Task Force in
these areas. The Task Force did not spend much, if any, time on
making recommendations on at least one of these areas, closely held
corporations, although it is an important area of policy concern in
our capital markets, and it is for that reason that we discuss it here.
The article also highlights areas for further research and analysis for
each of these topics.
II. ENFORCEMENT OF SECURITIES LAWS
The Task Force addressed the important issue of the extent to
which existing Canadian securities laws are enforced effectively.
Enforcement was relevant to the Task Force because it relates to the
2. PPNS are securities in which retail investors invest heavily and where, in some
situations, there are embedded hedge funds, yet due to an exemption, are
regulated by the wrapper for the securities; the wrapper is typically a debt
instrument.
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enhancement of the competitiveness of Canadian capital markets
and fundamentally affects investor confidence. One common
recurring theme that was noted by the Task Force was the
perception that Canadian markets lacked vigour in the
enforcement of securities laws.3 Public enforcement is particularly
important to the retail investor who may not have the resources,
expertise or ability to pursue claims through private enforcement
mechanisms. The ability of the regulatory system to address both
larger market concerns as well as the more particular needs of retail
investors is challenging. As a result, it is interesting to see how the
Task Force approached the general question of enforcement.
The Task Force commissioned several research papers on the topic
of enforcement, with a particular focus on public enforcement by
securities regulators. There was very little attention paid by the Task
Force to private enforcement mechanisms including compensation
mechanisms for investors in relation to the client-advisor
relationship. 4 However, research studies such as the Cory and
Pilkington paper 5 discuss restitution and civil liability as a possible
deterrence mechanism. In addition, the Condon and Puri paper
discussed, among other issues, the advisor-client relationship and the
impact that it can have upon both enforcement and compliance.
6
While private enforcement and various perspectives of compliance
can be seen to be a significant consideration in an overall and
complete conception of enforcement, the Task Force did not pursue
these potentially significant topics of discussion from the research
commissioned. Furthermore, the topic of self-regulatory
organizations (SROS) was not addressed at great length by the Task
Force. The recommendations made by the Task Force are unclear
about what role the SROS should play in the Canadian capital markets
and how their role can be improved.
3. For example, see Luzi Hail and Christian Leuz, "International Differences in the
Cost of Equity Capital: Do Legal Institutions and Securities Regulation Matter?"
(2006), 44 J. of Accounting Research 485 (observing that the cost of equity
capital is 25 basis points higher in Canada than in the United States); also see
Michael R. King and Dan Segal, "Valuation of Canadian vs. U.S. Listed Equity:
Is there a Discount?" (2003) Bank of Canada Working Paper 2003-6 (concluding
that Canadian public companies are valued significantly lower than those in the
United States while attempting to control for a number of variables).
4. Civil liability has often come up as a topic of discussion, for example see Ontario
Ministry of Finance, Five Year Review Committee Final Report - Reviewing the
Securities Act (Ontario) (Toronto, Queen's Printer for Ontario, 2003), pp. 130-33
(discussing civil liability and its role in enforcement).
5. See infra, footnote 12.
6. M. Condon and P. Puri, "The Role of Compliance in Securities Regulatory
Enforcement", The Report, supra, footnote 1, at volume VI.
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Even with the focus on public enforcement, it should be noted that
the Task Force's primary interest was with respect to enforcement in
terms of formal mechanisms and inputs and outputs of the
enforcement departments. Thus, the Task Force did not fully
consider the entire spectrum of regulation, from rule-design to
compliance to enforcement, and this is certainly an area ripe for
further research and analysis. For example, one important issue is the
possibility of substitution effects. A review of substitution effects
would postulate whether less back-ended enforcement may still equal
the same level of compliance if more efforts were taken earlier in the
spectrum to ensure compliance. 7 This could be bolstered by a careful
review of possible innovations in the design and implementation
phases of enforcement.8 Thus, the Task Force's recommendations
could be further enhanced by taking a broader view of securities
regulation .
9
As was mentioned in the report, international investors may attach
a "Canadian risk premium" when investing in Canadian equities.
Vigorous enforcement may enhance the credibility of Canadian
securities regulation and, in turn, help attract risk-adverse investors
to Canadian markets. Research conducted by Professor Uptal
Bhattacharya l° investigated the efficacy of securities law
enforcement from both an international and a local level. His
survey of the literature1 finds that while securities laws exist in most
countries, they are not enforced in many countries. Other findings
include the fact that countries with stricter enforcement of securities
laws have lower cost of capital and more fluid markets. Bhattacharya
also points to some evidence that it is better to have no insider trading
law than to have an insider trading law that is not enforced. Overall,
7. See Poonam Puri, "Enforcement Effectiveness in the Canadian Capital Markets"
(Capital Markets Institute, 2005) [unpublished, archived with authors].
8. For example, see Christine Parker, "Reducing the Risk of Policy Failure:
Challenges for Regulatory Compliance" (2000) Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (author carefully reviews compliance failures as well
as many different innovative approaches towards enhancing compliance).
9. See Mary Condon, "Rethinking Enforcement and Litigation in Ontario
Securities Regulation" (2006), 32 Queen's L.J. I (author reviews policy issues
through public, criminal and quasi-criminal sanctions, including civil remedies,
and proposes that both public and private mechanisms may be interdependent).
10. See U. Bhattacharya, "Enforcement and its Impact on Cost of Equity and
Liquidity of the Market", The Report, supra, footnote 1, at volume VI.
11. His survey includes a review of some key studies such as Luzi Hail and Christian
Leuz, "International differences in the cost of equity capital: do legal institutions
and securities regulation matter? (2005) [unpublished, archived at SSRN], online:
ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 15/2003 < http://ssrn.com/abstract = 641981 >.
This paper studied over 40 countries and came to the conclusion that countries
with a strict enforcement of securities laws have a lower cost of capital.
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research commissioned by the Task Force supports the conclusion
that enforcement of securities laws reduces the cost of capital and in
turn increases liquidity in the capital markets.
Although it is clear that improvements to enforcement of
Canadian securities laws are required, the Task Force was also
sensitive to the fact that Canada has its own unique circumstances,
culture and traditions. Accordingly, there was attention given to the
fact that U.S. enforcement successes should not lead Canada to
blindly transplant U.S. enforcement models without regard to
Canada's own circumstances. Thus, the Task Force commissioned
research from The Honourable Peter Cory and Professor Marilyn
Pilkington 12 (the "Cory and Pilkington Paper," which will be
discussed later) to look into questions such as public concerns
about enforcement, public policy goals, procedural issues, the
balance between public and private enforcement1 3 and the balance
between regulatory and criminal enforcement. 
14
The Task Force also commissioned research to draw comparisons
between Canadian and U.S. enforcement apparatuses. 15 Professor
Howell Jackson compared the budgets and staffing levels for
securities regulators in the United States and Canada, collected
data on enforcement activity in Canada and followed that with a
comparison of enforcement activity between the United States and
Canada. Professor Jackson found that:
0 When adjusted for population, GDP or market capitaliza-
tion, the levels of Canadian supervisory budgets and
staffing levels do not seem wildly out of line and may
actually be more intensive than the United States.
12. P. Cory and M. Pilkington, "Critical Issues in Enforcement", The Report, supra,
footnote 1, at 171, volume VI. Their views were also formed with the assistance of
a board of experienced Canadian securities practitioners.
13. It should also be noted that some studies have suggested that public enforcement
does not necessarily benefit stock markets as much as disclosure and laws
facilitating private enforcement. See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de Silanes
and Andrei Shleifer, "What Works in Securities Law" (2006), 61 J. of Finance 1.
14. It should be noted that the Task Force was informed by a number of research
studies. One research study examined the effectiveness of broad principles versus
highly detailed rules (see L. Cunningham, "Principles and Rules in Public and
Professional Securities Law Enforcement: A Comparative U.S.-Canada Inquiry",
The Report, supra, footnote 1, at volume VI). Another study examined the
development of "compliance cultures" and useful regulatory techniques for
fostering compliance (see M. Condon and P. Puri, "The Role of Compliance in
Securities Regulatory Enforcement", The Report, supra, footnote 1, at volume
VI).
15. See H. Jackson, "Regulatory Intensity in the Regulation of Capital Markets: A
Preliminary Comparison of Canadian and U.S. Approaches," The Report, ibid.
at volume VI.
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* However, Canadian regulatory budgets per staff member
are lower than their counterparts in the United States, with
U.S. budgets per staff member being about 60% higher.
There does not seem to be evidence that more Canadian
personnel is needed, though one may wish to revisit the
issue of budget levels.
* For the years 2002-2004, Canadian public enforcement
activity was much lower than that of the United States,
even when one performed scaling adjustments. However,
more recent data indicates that, given plausible scaling
factors, Canadian public enforcement is roughly compar-
able to that of the United States (though private enforce-
ment is still much lower). Nevertheless, Professor Jackson
cautions that drawing comparisons is difficult since one
could compare based on many different factors such
number of actions, level of market capitalization, monetary
fines imposed etc.
* Overall, in the past few years there has been some volatility
in Canadian sanctioning practices with an upward trend.
Professor Jackson notes that more work needs to be done
to understand whether the trends are temporary or
permanent.
* Private enforcement is substantially less in Canada but
Professor Jackson cautions against moving towards a U.S.
system of class actions as there are many reasons to believe
that this form of the U.S. litigation system is inefficient and
inequitable.
Professor Jackson's study seems to suggest that the perceived
differences between the vigorousness of enforcement of Canada and
the United States may not necessarily be heavily tied to funding or
staffing levels as some might be tempted to hypothesize. His
approach is a first step towards comparative analysis between
Canada and the United States. It should be noted that his research
focused essentially on hard inputs (financial funding levels and
human resources) and outputs (enforcement activities). Further
research on other important factors such as practices in the exercise of
discretion in bringing enforcement proceedings and non-
enforcement compliance techniques is the natural next step; until
then, one should be cautious in drawing any causative inferences
between levels of funding and staffing on the one hand and levels of
enforcement activity on the other hand. While funding and staffing
may play an important role in levels of enforcement, this may be an
[Vol. 46
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incomplete picture given the different contexts of Canada and the
United States. 
16
Another natural next step for future research is to consider how
enforcement effectiveness can actually be measured. This analysis
must go beyond a comparison of monetary inputs and outputs in
terms of cases pursued or sanctions levied. How can behavior
modification, resulting from enforcement actions, actually be
measured? How can the level of compliance with rules actually be
evaluated?
The Task Force was greatly assisted by the Cory and Pilkington
Paper and for the most part, agreed with their recommendations.
Their key recommendations were:
17
* Priorities and Performance: securities regulators and
enforcement agencies should establish a set of priorities and
regularly evaluate whether enforcement has attained stated
objectives.
* Investigation: A study should be conducted to assess needs
for police services in investigation of capital market crimes
and the various contributions to be made by municipal,
provincial and federal police services. IMET should con-
tinuously develop and maintain expertise required to
conduct complex capital-market offence investigations.
The IMET should be expanded to conduct all necessary
investigations or the capacity of other police forces should
be enhanced in order to address the cases not addressed by
the ]MET. Within each IMET and securities regulator there
should be a Senior Independent Review Officer (a sIRo) to
provide focus, supervision and accountability for strategic
decisions in an investigation. The SIRO would have a status
similar to a Securities Commissioner and such persons
might be found among the senior ranks of counsel in
private practice or the prosecution service. In particular,
they may be found among individuals recently retired who
remain at the peak of performance, and can bring their
abilities and experience to bear.
0 Prosecution: The SIRO should have independent authority to
determine whether a matter should be sent for a hearing by
16. For a closer look at private vs. public enforcement in the United States alone, see
James D. Cox and Randall Thomas with the assistance of Dana Kiku, "Public
and Private Enforcement of the Securities Laws: Have Things Changed Since
Enron?" (2005), 80 Notre Dame L. Rev. 893.
17. This is a summary only. More detailed discussion can be found in The Report,
supra, footnote 1.
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a securities tribunal or for prosecution as a provincial
offence. It may be appropriate, where a provincial
prosecution has been authorized, to authorize counsel
retained or employed by the securities regulator to
prosecute it.
• Adjudication: The adjudicative functions of securities
commissions should be transferred to independent tribu-
nals composed of individuals with expert knowledge of law,
procedure and the operation of capital markets. The
National Judicial Institute should prepare judges in the
adjudication of complex capital market offences. Finally,
the Task Force has recommended the creation of a separate
capital markets court to which jurisdiction, both provincial
and federal, is ceded. Such a court would have jurisdiction
over all capital market regulatory offences.' 8
" Penalties and Orders: Legislatures should consider enacting
laws similar to s. 380 of the Criminal Code of Canada,
specifying the aggravating circumstances that must be
taken into account in imposing a sentence for offences
under securities legislation and the non-mitigating factors
that must not be taken into account. Penalties and orders
should be harmonized across the country yet applied with
regional sensitivity. Provisions governing costs should be
reviewed, considering best practices of other jurisdictions,
and harmonized.
" Redress for Investors: Securities regulators should consider
applying to court more frequently for restitution, compen-
sation and damages on behalf of aggrieved persons.
Consideration should be given to authorizing security
tribunals as well as courts (adjudicating under provincial
or criminal legislation) to order compensation or restitution
under a fair set of rules.
" Self-regulatory Organizations. The roles and jurisdiction of
SROS should be reviewed. Such a review would consider,
with respect to SROS, the applicability of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, powers to obtain
documents and call witnesses, immunity from civil liability,
and applications for a court monitor.
* National Management of Enforcement: Regardless of
18. In making these recommendations, the Task Force was, however, mindful of the
more gradual recommendations in the Cory and Pilkington Paper in this regard,
which stated that every reasonable effort should be made to accomplish the same
result within the current court system.
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whether Canada adopts a unified or harmonized approach
to securities regulation, it is fundamentally important that
enforcement be managed on a national basis to ensure the
effective use of resources, the development and deployment
of expert skill and knowledge across the country, and the
independence and accountability of enforcement processes.
Despite the breadth of these recommendations, many challenges
remain for the future. It is not fully clear how these recommendations
ought to be implemented nor is it apparent how some of these
recommendations might harmonize with each other. For example,
while it was recommended that enforcement be managed on a
national basis, it is uncertain what type of organization or entity
would direct such management. 19 And, as will be discussed later, the
balance between criminal investigative powers and self-regulatory
investigations will have to be carefully balanced in light of protections
afforded under the Canadian Charter.
However, since the release of the Task Force report, a number of
important developments have taken place. Following up on
recommendations relating to IMET, there has been a new special
advisor appointed by the federal government to assist IMET in
enhancing its effectiveness.2 0 On another front, the Securities Fraud
Enforcement Working Group was struck shortly after the Task Force
Report was released; this group recently reported back to the
provincial ministers of justice and made recommendations such as
more resources and better legal tools for investigators. 21 As well,
drawing on the concept of the Senior Independent Review Officer
(SIRo) recommended by the Allen Report, the osc has announced the
appointment of a special advisor on ethics and enforcement, to assist
the Chair and Executive Director of the osc on the direction of
enforcement investigations. 22 It is interesting to note that the SIRO
concept envisioned by the Task Force would have involved
19. See James C. Baillie, "The Wise Persons' Committee Report: Another Attempt to
Revolutionize Canadian Securities Regulation" (2004), 40 C.B.L.J. 434 at pp.
434-39 (an interesting discussion of past efforts towards a national regulator and
some more detailed insights as to the various types of arrangements that may be
attempted as we strive for more unification for securities regulation in Canada).
20. Department of Finance (Canada), News Release, "Senior Expert Advisor to
RCMP Named to Bolster Fight Against While Collar Crime" (May 14, 2007),
online: Department of Finance < http://www.fin.gc.ca> (both the Honourable
Stockwell Day, Minister of Public Safety and the Honourable Jim Flaherty,
Minister of Finance, announce that Nicholas Le Pan has been appointed as an
expert advisor to the RCMP on its IMET).
21. Madhavi Acharya-Tom Yew, "Lawyer defends osc's record on crime", Toronto
Star (November 28, 2007).
22. osc, News Release (November 28, 2007).
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significant co-ordination among IMET and provincial/territorial
securities commissions; seemingly recognizing the challenges and
delays associated with such co-ordination, the osc decided not to wait
and implemented this valuable position at its own organization.
The Task Force's Report and recommendations are a healthy
addition to the currently evolving debate on enforcement of securities
laws in Canada. Although the connection between strong securities
laws enforcement, on the one hand, and lower cost of equity capital
on the other hand may seem intuitive to some, the research studies
commissioned by the Task Force lend a welcome empirical
foundation to this proposition. It would seem that this would be an
important point to address given the "Canadian discount" that seems
to be facing Canadian equity markets.
Rather, a reinvigorated Canadian securities enforcement model
may well depend more upon both the approach taken by Canadian
securities officials as well as the structure of the Canadian securities
enforcement landscape. The Cory and Pilkington Paper pick up well
on this theme and make numerous insightful recommendations that
have the effect of both rationalizing and consolidating focus on
securities enforcement (for example, through the use of an SIRO)
while, at the same time, increasing the magnification and power of
that focus such as through increased scope of IMET powers and
capacity.
Overall, the Task Force Report provides a landscape review of the
current situation with respect to Canadian securities law enforcement
and guidance towards where effective Canadian securities
enforcement may lie in the future. There are, however, a few
important questions that must still be addressed in the context of any
attempt to reinvigorate Canadian securities law enforcement.
One persistent and far-reaching fact about Canadian securities
enforcement is that it is seriously fragmented with its 13 separate
securities commissions and regulators. 23 While the Task Force and
Cory and Pilkington Paper did not go so far as to insist upon a single
common enforcement body, a careful review of their
recommendations leads one to the conclusion that those
recommendations would be greatly enhanced by such a single
unified entity. For example, IMET would not have to coordinate with
23. See Mary Condon, "The Use of Public Interest Enforcement Orders by Securities
Regulators in Canada" in A. Douglas Harris ed., wpc - Committee to Review the
Structure of Securities Regulation in Canada: Research Studies (Ottawa, Depart-
ment of Finance, 2003), online: < http://www.wise-averties.ca/report-en.html >.
In this study, it was noted that there was significant variation across the provinces
in relation to infractions pursued to enforcement hearings.
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as many different provincial bodies on its investigations if it could
simply deal with one common enforcement body. In addition to
increasing the potential efficiency of enforcement through a common
enforcement body, it should not be overlooked that that single
common enforcement body, as opposed to 13 disparate provincial
bodies, may lead to the perception of a stronger and more unified
approach to Canadian securities enforcement. This comes around
full circle and may help address the "Canadian discount" problem
that was alluded to in Professor Bhattacharya's study.
Further challenges for the future also involve the question of
appropriate scope of investigatory powers given the various different
legal rules of evidence applicable to criminal versus administrative
proceedings. This issue was clearly visited by the Supreme Court of
Canada in the case of R. v. Jarvis24 where the court held that if
evidence was obtained in a regulatory investigation where the
primary purpose of the investigation is criminal in nature, then such
evidence could not be used in a subsequent criminal investigation. In
a subsequent case 25 that considered the Jarvis decision in a securities
context, the court emphasized that the key question is when, if at all,
did an adversarial relationship crystallize? However, it is not
necessary to be myopic and simply focus on the legal issue raised in
these cases. There may be methods by which IMET and other
enforcement agencies could be improved without raising issues
related to the invocation of the power to compel testimony. For
example, compensation and promotion changes as well as structural
and organizational changes at IMET could increase efficiency and
effectiveness.
Clearly, whether one contemplates the use of a single common
enforcement entity or the current system of various different
provincial enforcement entities working in a more harmonized
fashion, it will be important to address exactly how investigations will
be conducted and how information may be shared with respect to
different types of investigations. We would also need to explore
further the question of how information may be shared on an
international basis, for example, in cooperation with a U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigation.
In particular, future studies will have to closely address the issue of
SROS and their investigative powers in light of the foregoing legal
24. [2002] 3 S.C.R. 757 , 219 D.L.R. (4th) 233, [2003] 3 W.W.R. 197.
25. The decision in Jarvis was considered in a securities law context in the case of R.
v. Mercer (2003), 223 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 134, 103 C.R.R. (2d) 232 (S.C.), which was
subsequently overturned by the Court of Appeal in R. v. Mercer (2005), 245 Nfld.
& P.E.I.R 50, 194 C.C.C. (3d) 370 (C.A.).
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issues. Since SROS have a rather broad capacity to investigate, it will be
critically important that SROS coordinate well with other entities or
with a single common enforcement entity to ensure that any potential
criminal investigations are not impaired or unduly prejudiced. In the
end analysis, even if there is a single common enforcement entity, it
may well be that criminal investigations will have to remain
segregated from other activities simply due to the legal rules of
evidence.
Finally, the suggestion that a securities regulator takes greater
advantage of applying to court seeking a redress or compensation for
aggrieved investors seems to be a plausible alternative to the stronger
regime of private enforcement prevalent in the United States. Given
that the Canadian legal environment has a different culture of
litigation, the use of securities regulators for seeking restitution or
compensation for aggrieved investors may be a better balance of the
compensatory and deterrent features of the law in Canada, as
opposed to a purely private adversarial model.
III. RULES VERSUS PRINCIPLES
Although the Task Force Report paid much attention to the topic
of enforcement, there is also an important sub-theme addressed
indirectly within the discussion of enforcement, i.e. rules versus
principles. For the purpose of this article, this topic certainly merits its
own independent discussion. The concept of rules as opposed to
principles plays an extremely important role in any discussion of
improving Canada's securities laws. In this context, "rules" refers to
highly specific rules which guide how private actors should behave
while "principles" refers to broad over-arching principles that
generally guide private actors' behaviours. Although the topic of
rules versus principles may seem at a theoretical level, distanced from
the everyday lives of retail investors, the practical outcomes of this
debate may have some significance nevertheless to the retail-
investment sector. The approach adopted by regulatory authorities
can be expected to have some impact on enforcement activities and
correspondingly may affect retail investors through its overall
structure.
More specifically, within the context of enforcement, the Task
Force was concerned that the "contrary to the public interest" section
of securities law may be abused. In particular, such provisions could
be the basis of sanctioning market behaviour where there were no
previous indications that such behaviour was viewed by regulatory
authorities to be offensive (so-called "gotcha enforcement"). The
[Vol. 46
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Task Force recommended that the "contrary to the public interest"
provisions be used sparingly and, if the criticized behaviour has not
been publicly identified in the past, the provision should only be used
to discipline egregious behaviour. The "contrary to the public
interest" provision is thus a general principle (as opposed to a specific
rule) whose ambiguity and vagueness, if left unchecked, may serve to
undermine just and fair enforcement.
In order to more fully explore the interplay between rules and
principles, the Task Force commissioned a research study by
Lawrence Cunningham. 26 In his research, Cunningham first
explores from a more theoretical standpoint the traditional
differences between rules and principles. He notes that the debate
over whether laws should be best articulated as rules or principles has
a rich jurisprudential and theoretical history far beyond the scope of
his research project. That debate has taken many forms including the
historical conception of law (as representative of hard rules) versus
equity (as representative of principles of fairness). As a contextual
backdrop, Cunningham cites famous works that address this
classical debate such as works by Duncan Kennedy, 27 Ronald
Dworkin2 8 and more recent works.
29
Overall, he conceptualizes lawmaking as an exercise that often
begins as a stated principle along with exceptions and limitations on
the exceptions. In the process, a greater degree of specificity is
brought to bear upon the process such that the law becomes more
rule-like. Indeed, in his end analysis, Cunningham views "rules" and
"principles" as points of extreme along a continuum of the law with
the observation that the majority of securities laws and regulations in
26. Lawrence Cunningham, "Principles and Rules in Public and Professional
Securities Law Enforcement: A Comparative U.S. - Canada Inquiry", The
Report, supra, footnote 1, at volume VI.
27. Duncan Kennedy, "Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication" (1976), 89
Harv. L. Rev. 1685 (a ground breaking and influential article that also
contributed heavily to the school of Critical Legal Studies. In this article,
Kennedy examined the form and substance of contract law and noted that they
are related and noted that the contradictory rhetoric of rules and standards is tied
to contradictory commitments to individualism and altruism).
28. Ronald Dworkin, "Hard Cases" in Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Harvard
University Press, 1977) (a classical treatment of the problem whereby Dworkin
proposes that when a judge adjudicates a difficult decision, she/he attempts to
choose the legal interpretation that best fits and justifies the existing legal
landscape).
29. See John Braithwaite, "Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal Certainty"
(2002), 27 Austl. J. of Leg. Phil. 47; Cass R. Sunstein, "Problems with Rules"
(1995), 83 Cal. L. Rev. 953; Louis Kaplow, "Rules and Standards: An Economic
Analysis" (1992), 42 Duke L.J. 557 and Pierre J. Schlag, "Rules and Standards"
(1985), 33 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 379.
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the United States and Canada reside somewhere in between the two
endpoints of this continuum.
Moreover, in the theoretical component of his discussion,
Cunningham notes that rules have the advantage of providing
relative certainty and predictability while the disadvantage is that
they could be "mere blueprints for evading their purposes" (through
artful dodging of a rule's spirit through literal compliance with its
technical provisions). On the other hand, principles have relative
capacity for exploiting advantageous situations while avoiding
disadvantageous ones; the downside to principles is that they pose
problems of uncertainty and expost surprise.
Ultimately, Cunningham's main point is that of balance. He
stresses the need for balance between rules and principles. This
balance turns on an ability to closely analyze certain given situations.
He notes that this means determining which is more important within
a given situation: predictability and certainty (which implies rules) or
fairness and context (which implies principles). Accordingly, he
concludes that when regulators decide to elevate either rules or
principles over the other, careful attention must be paid to the
consequences of doing so.
However, one must read Cunningham's work very carefully. As
mentioned before, he rightly takes a very nuanced view of "principles
vs. rules" and emphatically states that these two terms are really
opposite ends of the spectrum with most cases falling someplace in
between. For that reason, it is surprising that the Task Force
recommendations appear to view securities laws starkly as being
either rule or principle based. 30 What is perhaps even more surprising
is that the Task Force suggests a move towards a principle-based
approach yet also indicates a preference away from "gotcha"
legislation (i.e. laws without enough certainty to guide one's
conduct meaningfully). Given the uncertainty that often surrounds
a principle-based approach, it is hard to reconcile this with an agenda
that seeks to refrain from uncertain application of the law. This is
certainly another area that is ripe for further research and analysis.
30. These issues all involve a more detailed examination of the concept of regulation,
including compliance-based approaches as well as the more general idea of rules
and principles as forming different spheres of regulation. For a "decentered" view
of regulation see Julia Black, "Critical Reflections on Regulation" (2002), 27
Austl. J. Leg. Phil. 1, wherein the author attempts to develop a broader and more
encompassing theory of regulation as opposed to traditional state-centered
conceptions of regulation. In contrast, see Dimity Kingsford Smith, "What is
Regulation? A Reply to Julia Black" (2002), 27 Austl. J. Leg. Phil. 37 at pp. 37-
46. Also, for a review article of various different views on regulation see Steve
Tombs, "Understanding Regulation?" (2002), 11 Social and Leg. Stud. 113.
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Cunningham based his study on a number of empirical situations.
His first study analyzes empirical information regarding enforcement
actions by the SEC and the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA).
He classifies various types of laws along the rules-principles
continuum, with insider trading and market manipulation laws
being classified towards the principles end while securities offerings
are towards the rules-based end. Disclosure regulation and
accounting tends to be classified towards the centre of the
continuum. According to his study, the evidence tends to indicate
that both CSA and SEC members favour rules-based enforcement
slightly; however, he also notes that a significant portion of cases are
also principles-based. Comparing the SEC to the CSA, the SEC tends to
exhibit slightly more activity enforcing principle-based laws than the
CSA.
Cunningham then goes further and also compares the enforcement
activity of the U.S. National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)
and Canada's Investment Dealers Association (IDA) in their roles as
professional trade associations. Both the NASD and IDA are
empowered to make and enforce securities regulations regarding
their various members. Despite the fact that both the IDA and NASD
have extensively detailed rules, Cunningham's study suggests that
both organizations are heavily biased towards enforcing principles
over rules.
The key observation here is that both SEC and CSA exhibit
commonalities and, by the same token, both the NASD and IDA
exhibit commonalities. This suggests that at least one defining and
important variable is not so much the country of origin or written
materials as it is the identity and position of the enforcer. In this case,
the dichotomy seems to be public enforcer (SEC and CSA) preferring
rules-based enforcement slightly versus professional self-policing
enforcers (NASD and IDA) leaning heavily towards principle-based
enforcement. One other important point made by this study is that it
runs against the commonly held conception that U.S. securities laws
are more rules-based and that Canadian securities laws are more
principle-based. Quite simply stated, Cunningham's study does not
support such sweeping generalizations.
A large part of the rules vs. principles debate has to be situated
within Canada's future potential enforcement developments. In
either case, it may well be that at least some aspects of Canadian
securities law enforcement may take the form of rule-based laws.
There are two main possibilities at the moment that should be
considered. First, if Canada moves towards a common enforcement
body, then a rule-based regime may help quiet fears of having too
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much power reside in a single entity. In part, by taking away the
inherent discretion that resides in the enforcer/decision-maker under
a principles-based approach, greater confidence can be inspired in a
common enforcement body by requiring adherence to transparent
and predefined rules that can foster the certainty and confidence
required for such a body. Or, using Cunningham's analysis, in this
situation it may well be that a need for greater certainty is the variable
that drives the reform process.
Second, if Canada decides to stay away from a common
enforcement body in favour of more harmonized securities
enforcement among the 13 securities regulators across the country,
this too may require a more rules-based approach. In this case, the
driving factor would be a desire for uniformity across the country
and, in turn, uniformity would require that each jurisdiction be
certain what standards and rules are being promoted in each other
jurisdiction. Thus, this particular context would also emphasize
certainty and tend to require rules-based approaches. Of course, this
is not to suggest a false dichotomy of rules only or principles only.
Rather, what is being suggested is that, in the short term, a slide along
the continuum towards rule-based approaches may be expected
under Canada's likely future enforcement reforms.
The distinction between criminal law and administrative/quasi-
criminal law may also play an important role in determining whether
laws are more rules based or principles-based. Criminal law has
traditionally required a greater deal of certainty because it is thought
that if an individual is to be exposed to potentially severe
repercussions under criminal law, then the individual should be
allowed to know clearly what the prohibited behaviour is. This would
suggest that criminal sanctions require very clearly defined rules as
opposed to principles. On the other hand administrative sanctions do
not entail such severe repercussions and, as a result, a greater deal of
ambiguity and vagueness of laws is tolerable under these
circumstances. Given the importance of the distinction between
criminal and administrative law, if there is a common enforcement
body or harmonized enforcement between jurisdictions, there will
have to be clear procedural rules that can distinguish between
criminal and administrative proceedings.
IV. FINANCIAL LITERACY AND DISCLOSURE
The recommendations made by the Task Force in Volume I,
Chapter 4 were designed to address the issue of "what should I buy" in
the context of the retail investor. In this chapter the Task Force
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addressed three questions: (1) how do investors make investment
decisions; (2) is the form of presentation of public-company
disclosure adequate for investors' needs to make these decisions;
and (3) what opportunity does an investor have to be informed prior
to purchase. These questions were addressed in research undertaken
for the Task Force by Deaves et al.3 1 and their findings informed the
recommendations in this section.
The Deaves research had two parts. The first, which is of direct
interest to this article, was an online survey of 1,600 retail investors of
various levels of sophistication. The second was an interview of 20
institutional investors. The retail survey addressed issues such as "the
knowledge level of investors and the extent to which they are subject
to behavioural biases; what information, whether mandated
corporate discourse or information provided by third parties, is
used and the openness of investor to electronic disclosure."
These questions have always been relevant but take on added
emphasis with the importance of RSP investments and the move by
corporations from defined benefits plans (where decisions are made
for the employees and the risk of not meeting a pension promise is
borne primarily by the corporation) to defined contribution pension
plans (where investment decisions are made by the employees and the
risk of market fluctuations and poor investment decisions in terms of
asset allocation and diversification are borne directly by the employee
at retirement).
Although not directly tied into all of the discussion in this chapter
of the Task Force report, behavioural finance takes on great
importance in the recommendations and has implications for their
effectiveness in improving retail (and even institutional) investment
decisions.
In considering how financial markets value securities there are two
alternative paradigms. The received paradigm, certainly among
academics and those who use financial economic valuation models, is
the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH). Under this hypothesis
markets fully and instantaneously incorporate all information into
market prices in an unbiased way. Underlying this concept is the
assumption that "market participants are rational economic beings,
always acting in self-interest and making optimal decisions by trading
off costs and benefits weighted by statistically correct probabilities
and marginal utilities." 32 The alternative approach recognizes that
31. Richard Deaves, Catherine Dine and William Horton, "How Are Investment
Decisions Made", The Report, supra, footnote 1, at volume 2.
32. Andrew Lo, "Reconciling Efficient Markets with Behavioral Finance: The
Adaptive Markets Hypothesis" (2005), 7 The J. of Investment Consulting 1.
2008]
216 Canadian Business Law Journal
human behaviour deviates from rational decision-making under
uncertainty. Unlike the EMH, behavioural finance does not have a set
of fundamental axioms from which all behaviour can be generated. It
is rooted in empirical observation and controlled experiments. While
leading to interesting implications, there is no unified theory. These
approaches lead to different views on how capital markets
incorporate information and how securities are priced in capital
markets.
Fortunately for the purposes of the Task Force deliberations, there
was no need to enter this debate. There is no doubt that irrational
behaviour does occur and individual (retail) investors, while perhaps
not establishing market prices, inflict wealth losses on themselves by
their financial decisions. The extent of these biases has an influence on
a number of important issues in financial market oversight such as
disclosure practices and the importance and efficacy of investor
financial literacy.
Behavioural finance literature has progressed rapidly since 1974
with the original Tversky and Kahneman research. Researchers have
identified a number of biases and have subjected them to experiments
and empirical analyses. At least one researcher has argued that there
is a neuroscience perspective such that it is very difficult to change
certain types of behaviour. 33 The biases included procrastination and
status quo bias, hyperbolic discounting, 34 loss aversion (prospect
theory) and overconfidence. Many of these biases arise from
bounded rationality and choice overload.35 The implications for
decision-making are numerous but two important ones are a lack of
diversification in portfolio selection and poor asset allocation.36
The Deaves study confirms that retail investors in the survey suffer
from many of these biases and end up making incorrect decisions with
respect to diversification and asset allocation. Generally most of the
investors had a low level of investment knowledge and made
decisions with the assistance of wealth advisers. This latter
observation was also confirmed in an investor survey undertaken
for the Investment Funds Institute of Canada (IFIC).37
33. Ibid., at pp. 26-29.
34. Under uncertainty, individuals drastically reduce the weight of future outcomes
in decision-making. Thus both good and bad outcomes will have less impact than
current ones.
35. An interesting observation in the literature is that choice overload is a problem
for those who are knowledgeable.
36. These biases are discussed in Deaves, supra, footnote 31, at section 4 and Andrew
Lo, supra, footnote 32, and Andrew Lo, "The Adaptive Markets Hypothesis"
(2004), The J. of Portfolio Management (30th Anniversary Issue) at pp. 15-29.
37. Reported in the Globe and Mail Report on Business Supplement for the Investment
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The Deaves survey also found that disclosure of financial
information was an important area for investors. Investors stated
that they used mandatory disclosures and third party information but
surprisingly they noted that the information that is being used is
viewed as not being very useful. This information was not accessed
electronically although retail investors said that they are open to this
form of disclosure. A slim majority embraced a continuously updated
disclosure document available online that consolidates relevant
information. Finally, many of the investors purchased mutual funds
and they desired clearer and greater disclosure of fees and returns.
As in all survey studies, great care should be used in interpreting
what respondents say they will do especially under a scenario that is
unfamiliar to them. For example, the use of electronic disclosure may
be appealing to investors, but integrating it into their investment
decision-making may be more difficult. Alternatively there may be no
trouble in integrating this information if retail investors continue to
ignore it possibly because they do not understand the contents of
current documents.
Given bounded rationality and choice overload the Task Force
makes the following recommendation: "The Task Force encourages
securities regulators to work to make disclosure documents more
effective by improving the method by which information is made
available to investors to enhance the penetrability and
comprehensibility of that information." The Task Force discussed
the trade-off of plain language disclosure documents, which would
address the retail investor issue and moderate disclosure costs and the
necessity of having full disclosure.
Regulators have moved in this direction currently in the mutual
fund area with the release of a concept paper on disclosure of mutual
fund information. The Joint Forum of Financial Market Regulators
proposed a two-page document called "Fund Facts" that contained
certain key information including the top ten investments held by the
mutual fund, past performance, type of investor that is best suited to
the investment, and advisor cost. The document is to be provided to
investors either prior to or at the time of the sale of the mutual fund.3 s
The Task Force also addressed the issue of electronic delivery of
documents and concluded that an "access equals delivery" model be
implemented, as long as there is a free, publicly accessible full record
of all legally mandated disclosure documents such as SEDAR. Under
Funds Institute of Canada. The study found that approximately 80% of mutual
fund holders used advisors in their financial decisions.
38. Joint Forum of Financial Market Regulators, "Proposed Framework 81-406:
Point of sale disclosure for mutual and segregated funds" (June 15, 2007).
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this model an investor cannot request documents in non-electronic
format. If information in this form is needed, it can be accessed from
the wealth adviser. The recommendation is as follows:
The Task Force recommends: (i) that all requirements for the delivery of
disclosure documents be abolished and, instead, that all disclosure
documents be required to be filed on SEDAR and on the issuer's website,
and (ii) the elimination of any requirement to "deliver" a document would
render investor consent to "access equals delivery" unnecessary.
39
Investor education/financial literacy has and continues to be an
important issue given the observed financial abilities of retail
investors. There are many initiatives in this area. For example The
Council for Investor Education is a forum of not-for-profit
organizations and regulators interested in empowering Canadians
with the knowledge to make informed financial decisions. The
members include provincial security regulators and self-regulatory
organizations, among others. These organizations recognize that
investor education is crucial to effective investment decision-making
- there is a set of information that investors must have: time value of
money, importance of diversification and asset allocation, and the
impact of fees on performance. However, attempts to provide
investor education have been at best modestly successful. Further if
behaviour is "hard wired" and investor education is intended to
reduce some problems, many decisions made, not only by retail but
also by sophisticated investors, will continue to be irrational.
The Task Force has three recommendations related to financial
literacy. 40 They are as follows:
* financial literacy must be treated as a matter of national
priority;
* create a national coordinator of public and private sector
investor education initiatives; and
* undertake further study by capital market stakeholders to
design programmes that ensure that the objective of
financial literacy as a national priority is achieved.
39. The Task Force also recommended that securities regulators encourage and
facilitate the use of XBRL, information layering and interactivity within electronic
disclosure documents. The Task Force proposed a model called MERIT (Model for
Effective Regulatory Information Transfer) that uses XBRL and demonstrates how
information disclosure can be improved and be as informative as the investor's
knowledge requires.
40. The Task Force is not alone in the push to financial literacy. In the United
Kingdom, the FSA introduced an education campaign in 2006; the U.S. Treasury
launched its National Strategy for Financial Literacy in Autumn 2006; in
November 2006, the Dutch Ministry of Finance established CentIQ.
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There is, however, a concern about financial literacy. Williams notes
that financial literacy can be of two types: the first is to empower
investors within existing consumer protection laws; this approach is
intended to reduce barriers to participation and improve access to
information. The second type is to shift responsibility of personal
economic security from the state to the individual resulting in
individuals becoming accountable for market governance. Williams
argues that this approach is a result of market expansion and the
introduction of new investment products.
4 1
Williams investigates why regulators deploy financial literacy
education. Looking at the FSA and the Financial Consumer Agency of
Canada investor education mandates, she "cautions against
uncritical acceptance of claims that financial literacy education
empowers consumers and advances their interests." Williams argues
that in a setting of increased volatility of markets and an increase in
the supply of new products, "the empowerment discourse of financial
education may mask a more complicated regulatory project in which
education of the consumer serves also to protect regulators and
financial firms." 42 Although based on a sample of two regulators, the
paper presents an issue that should be considered in the development
of financial literacy programs.
A crucial question that was not considered by the Task Force is
whether investor education can improve investment decisions. The
extent of the impact of behavioural biases on investment decisions
has been investigated in some depth in the finance literature. The
increased importance of defined contribution plans has provided
some further evidence of the extent of behavioural biases. Even
though corporations have provided financial education to members
of their plans, employee irrational behaviour continues in their DC
plan investments. Research shows that members default on their
payments, do not make effective asset allocation decisions, do not
rebalance portfolios and do not contribute the maximum amount
even though employers will match their investment.
Recognizing the severity of these problems the United States
enacted the Pension Protection Act (PPA) in 2006, 4 3 the purpose of
which was to provide a safety net for pension fund members who
cannot make their own decisions. The PPA permits employers to
automatically enroll members and bump up contribution levels on an
41. Toni Williams, "Empowerment of Whom and for What? Financial Literacy
Education and the New Regulation of Consumer Financial Services" (2007), 29
Law & Pol'y 226.
42. Ibid., at p. 248.
43. Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780.
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ongoing basis. Also it provides a "safe harbour" against future legal
actions by plan members who believe that their retirement income is
inadequate provided that the employer/sponsor acts prudently and
within the PPA guidelines. DC plan sponsors have introduced
automatic enrollment, automatic escalation of contribution
amounts in default or active funds with asset allocation related to
date of retirement. A survey in 2006 of 50 large DC plans found that 24
had already implemented automatic enrollment and two were
considering it within the coming year. Also 14 had automatic
contribution increase policies. Unfortunately, many plan
participants simply accept plan defaults set by the company
sponsors - this is the path of least resistance. This passive choice
can be explained by predicted behavioural tendencies.
Can education overcome the behavioural problems and lead to
better decision-making by investors? Financial education attempts
by companies for their employees provide some indication of the
success. One study44 investigates financial seminars offered at 40
locations collectively employing one third of the company's workers.
The seminars were given by an outside firm specializing in these
services. Overall, approximately 17% of eligible workers attended the
seminars and while many reported intentions to make changes, few
actually did so.
In a related study45 the authors found that of non-plan participants
who attended the seminar, 100% planned to enroll while 14%
actually did over a subsequent six-month period; interestingly 7% of
non-attendees also made the change so the financial education
seminar seemed to have some impact. For actual plan participants,
those who attended planned to make changes in fund selection and
fund allocation along with increased contribution rates.
Approximately one-third of those who said they intended to make
a change actually did so and the absolute number of those who
changed was just slightly larger than those who did not attend the
seminar. In another paper,46 a follow-on survey undertaken
44. Brigitte Madrian and Dennis Shea, "The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 41 l(k)
Participation and Savings Behaviour" (2001), 116 The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 1149 at pp. 1149-187.
45. James Choi, David Laibson, Brigitte Madrian and Andrew Metrick, "Saving for
Retirement on the Path of Least Resistance", in Ed McCaffrey and Joel Slemrod,
eds., Behavioral Public Finance. Toward a New Agenda (New York, NTY, Russell
Sage Foundation, 2006) at pp. 304-51. The financial seminars were held from
January to June 2000 and the actual changes in behaviours over the period
December 31, 1999 through June 30, 2000.
46. Robert Clark, Madeleine d'Ambrosio, Ann McDermed and Kshama Sawant,
"Retirement and Saving Decisions: the Role of Information and Education"
(2006), 5 Journal of Pension Economics and Finance 45 at pp. 45-67.
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subsequent to attending financial education seminars asked whether
the individuals had actually altered their savings behaviour. The
authors found that of the 41 % who reported they intended to
establish a supplemental savings plan in a previous survey, 25%
actually did so. Of the 31% who intended to increased contributions
to an existing plan, 42% reported that they had done so. Of the 37%
that reported they would increase contributions to an existing plan,
42% reported in the follow up survey that they had done this.
This literature suggests that retirement (financial) education, while
having significant resources dedicated to it, seems not to have had a
major impact on behaviour. In fact, in the pension area, behavioural
finance has been used to develop strategies to improve decision-
making by pensioners in order improve their wealth level at
retirement.47 These strategies do not focus on financial literacy!
While the literature noted above concentrates on defined
contribution employee pension plans, similar financial literacy
issues arise in investments outside of the employee pension area.
Thus given behavioural tendencies operate to blunt the impact of
education, there is some question as to whether this should be a major
thrust.
We do not suggest that financial literacy/investor education
attempts be eliminated. However, there are a number of questions
that need to be addressed before a program is developed and
implemented. These include the following: what is the purpose of the
program - is it to empower investors within existing consumer
protection laws or to make investors responsible to influence
financial markets through market governance? At what level do
you start the process - is it high school or later in life when
individuals have to make investment decisions? What topics should
be included in the program given the level chosen?
Since most investors in the Deaves survey invested through mutual
funds, it is essential that they understand the importance of fees in
their ultimate wealth and the concepts of asset allocation and
diversification. While some retail investors do their own investing, it
is usually done with the help of an investment advisor. Education on
how to evaluate an advisor and what to expect from them is also
crucial.
Finally, behavioural finance can be used to think about relevant
education for individual investors. Also, investment products can be
developed that minimize the impact of behavioural biases. An
47. Peter Kooreman and Henriette Prast, "What Does Behavioral Economics Mean
for Policy? Challenges to Savings and Health Policies in the Netherlands" (paper
presented to the Netspar Panel, April 26, 2007) [unpublished].
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example is a mutual fund that automatically changes asset allocation
as the investor ages.
V. CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP: PYRAMIDS, DUAL CLASS
AND DIRECT OWNERSHIP
An important factor in the Task Force mandate was to make
recommendations to maintain and in fact improve Canadian capital-
market competitiveness. The Task Force commissioned a number of
research papers in this area of interest and in many instances the
research was reflected directly in the Report and the
recommendations. There were two research papers that did not
lead to recommendations. The first paper identified a problem in the
venture-capital market, which required firms to go public too early
and thereby incur both indirect and direct costs. Although not
stated explicitly in the Report, this area was likely not considered in
the recommendations since the problem was primarily one of the
venture-capital market and not the publicly traded equity market.
The second paper considered the impact of the divergence of voting
and cash-flow rights generated by pyramid structures and voting
structures in which there were classes of shares with differential
voting rights. This paper entitled "Some Obstacles to Good
Corporate Governance in Canada and How to Overcome Them"
provided an excellent summary of the literature in this area. The
authors make the following statement concerning the state of
Canadian capital markets:
Canadian regulators, lawmakers and good governance advocates alike look
towards the United States and United Kingdom for ideas. This is sensible in
many realms of law because those countries, like Canada have Common Law
legal systems and rely heavily on stock markets to assemble and allocate
capital. Unfortunately, the structure of governance in much of corporate
Canada is radically different from that in either the United States of the
United Kingdom, and more closely resembles that in Latin America, parts of
Europe and East Asia.49
Dual class shares and pyramid structures have been a major
constituent of Canadian capital markets for many years. For the
former, there are three types of restricted voting shares; 50 in some
48. Douglas Cumming, "Do Companies Go Public too Early in Canada", The
Report, supra, footnote 1, at p. 215 (volume 4).
49. R. Morck and B. Yeung (2006) "Some Obstacles to Good Corporate Governance
in Canada and How to Overcome Them", The Report, supra, footnote 1, at p.
286 (volume 4) (Morck and Yeung).
50. Non-voting shares have no votes; subordinated voting shares have one vote per
share while the other class has multiple votes per share; restricted voting shares
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cases the superior voting shares are not listed on the stock exchange.
The most frequent method of generating a dual-class share structure
is through an Ipo; next in popularity is a split of the existing single-
share class. Subsequent to the tPo the company would issue more
restricted voting shares relative to superior voting shares thus
leveraging the voting power of the control group. Dual class
recapitalizations are generally observed in companies in which
there is a combination of a large controlling shareholder with family
interests as opposed to concentrated ownership on its own. While
there has been a reduction in the number of dual-class share
companies over the period 1989 to 1998, their number is still large and
they represent substantial amount of assets in the capital market.
Pyramid structures generally have an ultimate owner, usually a
family, at the apex of a control pyramid with multiple layers where
multiple class shares, cross holdings and appointment of family
members and friends in top executive positions establish control and
increase the firm's opacity. Attig presents data showing that 53.45%
of Canadian firms are controlled by a pyramid structure in which
there are on average 3.56 tiers. This percentage is much higher than
found in both the U.S. and U.K. capital markets. Interestingly,
family control was found in 63% of these firms and family
management in 70%.51
The theory associated with the problems of dual class and pyramid
share structures is straightforward and well known. Under a one
share, one vote regime, agency costs arise when ownership and
control diverge such as when management has a small ownership
percentage. Any agency costs that could arise are managed not only
through governance but also through the takeover market. Research
has also shown that agency costs can exist as well at high levels of
control due to entrenchment of management.52 There is a rich
literature investigating the private benefits of control.53 Where dual
class or pyramid structures exist, cash flow rights and voting rights
diverge, thereby introducing two types of agency costs: the first is
entrenchment, since a set of shareholders has the voting rights;54 the
have a vote equal to the vote on the other class but can only elect a minority of
the board of directors. As of 1998, 148 companies listed on the TSX had a dual
class share structure; 35% had non-voting shares, 56%, subordinated voting
shares and 5% restricted voting shares. See B. Amoako-Adu and B. Smith, "Dual
Class Firms: Capitalization, ownership structure and recapitalization back into
single class" (2001), 25 J. of Banking and Finance 1083.
51. N. Attig, "Balance of Power" (2005), Canadian Investment Review 6.
52. P. Halpern, R. Kieschnick and W. Rotenberg, "On the Heterogeneity of Levered
Going Private Transactions" (1999), 12 Review of Financial Studies 281.
53. See the discussion in Morck and Yeung, supra, footnote 49.
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second is behaviour that shifts benefits to the controlling
shareholders from restricted voting shareholders since the
controlling shareholders have a small cash-flow rights position.
This divergence between cash flow and voting rights can lead to
control of a company with a small voting position. As of 1998 for all
restricted voting shares, to hold 50% of the voting control required a
minimum of 15% of the equity. 55
There are commentators who find dual-class share structures to be
less serious than the majority of the literature. Allaire reviews the
various arguments concerning dual-class shares and concludes that,
as long as minority shareholders are well protected "this capital
structure provides the advantages of continued, long-term
commitment by the entrepreneur/founder and, in many cases, of
his/her descendants." 56 This paper recognizes concerns with dual-
class shares and recommends the implementation of a proper
framework to protect the rights and interests of minority
shareholders. Examples include takeover bid provisions, capping
voting ratios such that the entrepreneur must own at least 20% of the
company's voting capital in order to achieve 50% of the votes.
Why should the Task Force have been concerned about the impact
of the divergence of voting and cash flow rights through the use of
dual class and pyramid structures? Morck and Yeung. 57 provide a
number of concerns that come from their review of the literature.
* "Control blocks in large Canadian firms are more substan-
tial than in any other Common Law country. Further,
Canadian controlling shareholders make more extensive
use of pyramiding and/or super-voting shares, for their
control rights exceed their actual share ownership by a
greater margin than in other Common Law countries."58
* There is a Canada discount such that holding all relevant
influences constant, Canadian stocks are valued by about
9.3% on average over the period 1991 to 2000. While there
54. V. Jog, P Chu and S. Dutta, "One Share-One Vote" (Fall 2006) Canadian
Investment Review (showing that dual-class share companies are subject to
takeover activity but clearly this activity must be to the benefit of the controlling
shareholder. The authors note that over the period 1993 to 2004 there were 143
firms with dual-class shares delisted, of which 50% were acquired, merged or
privatized).
55. See B. Amoako-Ado and B. Smith, supra, footnote 50, at p. 1088 (table 1).
56. Y. Allaire, "Dual-class share structures in Canada: Some modest proposals"
[unpublished, archived at SSRN], online: (IGOPP) Working Paper Series, <http://
ssrn.com/abstract = 952043 >.
57. Supra, footnote 49.
58. Ibid., at p. 313.
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may be a number of explanations, one possible one is
"Canadian controlling shareholders siphon off private
benefits."
59
" If insiders take large private benefits of control, less
remains for public shareholders and the size and activity of
the country's stock market will be negatively affected
without offsetting regulatory action. The empirical evi-
dence "shows that Canada has smaller and less active stock
markets than would be expected in a Common Law
country of its size. Relatively small, relatively sleepy stock
markets are a likel symptom of a national corporate
governance deficit."
6
* "Canada entrusts the corporate governance of much of its
large corporate sector to entrenched, politically influential,
old money families. Morck et al.6' present evidence that
this saps its economic performance. They refer to this
condition as 'the Canadian disease', and suggest it weakens
many developed and developing economies."
62
Morck and Yeung conclude "evidence suggests that private
benefits of control in Canada are larger than in other high income
Common Law countries . . . Large private benefits of control
undermine the good that might otherwise come from the presence of
large blockholders." 63 Throughout the Morck et al. paper there are
references to the negative impact on value of dual-class shares. Some
new research sheds additional light on the market impact of pyramid
and dual-class structures and provides avenues of continued
research. Attig et al.6 4 investigate the impact of concentrated
holdings on stock liquidity and information asymmetry in the
Canadian market. In their sample they classify firms as widely or
closely held by using a 10% ultimate control cutoff (using a 20%
cutoff did not affect the results). Less than 20% of the firms are widely
held. Of the closely held companies, more than half of the companies
have a single controlling shareholder and pyramids are the most
59. Ibid., at p. 316.
60. Ibid., at p. 318.
61. R. Morck, D. Strangeland and B. Yeung, "Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control,
and Economic Growth: The Canadian Disease" in R. Morck, ed., Concentrated
Corporate Ownership, National Bureau of Economic Research Conference
Volume (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2000), p. 322 (Morck et al.).
62. Morck and Yeung, supra, footnote 49.
63. Ibid.
64. N. Attig, W-M. Fong, Y. Gadhoum and L. Lang, "Effects of Large Shareholding
on Information Asymmetry and Stock Liquidity" (2006), 30 J. of Banking &
Finance 2875.
8 - 46 C.B.L.J.
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frequently used channel for which voting and cash-flow rights
diverge. Attig finds that closely held firms with significant ultimate
ownership have a wider bid-ask spread (lower liquidity) than widely
held firms but there was no evidence that information asymmetry was
more severe in closely held than in widely held firms as long as ultimate
control does not exceed ultimate ownership. If ultimate ownership is
held constant and ultimate control increases by the use of either
pyramids or dual-class shares, the stock is subject to more serious
information asymmetries and the bid-ask spread widens. These
results are consistent with the hypothesis that firms that have control
in excess of ownership manage disclosure of information in an
attempt to generate private benefits. 65 Other research has shown that
value is increasing in cash flow rights and not in voting rights in
considering dual class and pyramid share structures. Attig in
another paper finds that earnings management is more serious in
pyramid structures; the use of multiple class shares is only significant
when combined with the presence of family control.67 New research is
now being undertaken to look at accounting disclosures in dual class
and pyramid structures.
Li et al.,68 in a recent working paper, investigate institutional
holdings in dual and single-class shares. Using a sample of U.S. dual-
class shares and adjusting for determinants of institutional
investment, they find that institutional investors own a significantly
lower proportion of the equity in dual-class firms compared to their
percentage holding in single-class firms. Further they find that long-
term investors with strong fiduciary duties, such as insurance
companies and pension funds, more strongly avoid dual-class
shares than do short-term investors with weaker fiduciary duties
such as investment companies and independent investment advisors.
After a unification of the dual-class structure, institutions increase
65. These results are consistent with those observed in J. Fan and T. Wong,
"Corporate Ownership structure and the informativeness of accounting earnings
in East Asia" (2002), 33 J. of Accounting and Economics 410
66. See P. Gompers, J. Ishii and A. Metrick, "Extreme Governance: An Analysis of
Dual-Class Firms in the United States" (2006) Harvard Business School Working
Paper (U.S. data) [unpublished, archived with authors]; and S. Claessens, S.
Djankov, J. Fan and L. Lang, "Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment
Effects of Large Shareholding" (2002), 57 J. of Finance 2741 at pp. 2741-772 (for
Asian countries; also finding that the increase in firm value with cash-flow rights
decreases when voting rights exceed the cash-flow rights).
67. N. Attig, supra, footnote 51.
68. K. Li, H. Oritz-Molina and S. Zhao, "Do Voting Rights Affect Institutional
Investment Decisions? Evidence from Dual-Class Firms" Financial Management
[forthcoming in 2008], online: Kai Li - W.M. Young Professor of Finance at
Sauder School of Business UBC <http://finance.sauder.ubc.ca/'kaili/dual-
class FM.pdf>.
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their holdings of the firm. Thus if liquidity is an issue, dual-class
shares appear to reduce the demand of large investors.
A recent paper investigates the impact of cross listing companies in
the U.S. on security prices. 69 The authors observe that cross-listed
firms with a single class of shares have a permanent increase in
valuation only if they attract and maintain investor recognition over
time. Cross-listed firms with dual-class shares exhibit a permanent
increase in valuation regardless of the level of U.S. investor holdings.
The authors conclude that this increase in valuation for dual-class
firms suggests that "cross-listing lowers the risk of expropriation of
minority shareholders."
Given the empirical evidence of lowered market values and
reduced liquidity for pyramids and dual-class shares, the obvious
question is why have there not been significant numbers of either
recapitalization into a single class (unification) in the case of dual-
class shares or devolution of the pyramid through sell-offs, for
example, in the case of pyramid structures. For dual-class shares
there have been instances in which mergers or going private
transactions eliminated the dual class. In some situations there
have been unifications of the various equity classes, typically
occurring through a share exchange using a different exchange
ratio for each of the share classes into the new unified class. The
decision to unify by the controlling family/owner will reflect the
tradeoff of increasing value on the shares owned with a reduction in
value through the private benefits of control. Clearly, the greater the
difference between control and cash-flow rights, the less likely is a
voluntary unification unless there is a favourable exchange ratio.
Over the period 1979 to 1998 there were 56 cases of unifications
through share exchange. The reasons were varied and included the
following: a condition of debt restructuring in the cases of financial
distress; facilitation of sale of a control block; increase the appeal to
institutional investors in the case of a seasoned issue or increase the
appeal to investors prior to a seasoned issue and facilitate a listing in
the United States.7
VI. POLICY ISSUES
In the dual class situation investors vote on the introduction of the
69. M. King and D. Segal, "The Long-Term Effects of Cross-Listing, Investor
Recognition, and Ownership Structure on Valuation" Review of Financial
Studies [forthcoming in 2008].
70. See B. Amoako-Ado and B. Smith, supra, footnote 50 (also noting that in four
situations the elimination of the dual-class structure was associated with the
introduction of a shareholder rights plan).
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restricted voting shares and given this fact, some commentators
suggest that whatever the impact of these structures nothing needs to
be done in the regulatory process. Unfortunately many of these
structures were introduced during a period where there was a limit on
the amount of foreign property that could be held in portfolios in
order to maintain their tax deferred status. Thus investors had very
little choice, apart from not purchasing these shares and thus
reducing diversification benefits. Also, while the market seems to
price restricted voting shares lower, 71 there is some indication that
investors, certainly in 2004, did not understand the status of the
shares they purchased. In 2004 the TSX announced that it would
introduce extensions to the ticker symbol to designate the voting
power of the shares of companies with dual-class shares. Using a set of
stocks that were subject to the re-symbolizing decision and that
passed certain exclusion criteria, Attig72 investigated the impact on
share price and liquidity around the date of the announcement. More
than 80% of the involved firms were family controlled through
pyramid holdings. He found that the rule to re-symbolize tickers had
a negative and significant impact on the prices of lower voting and
non-voting classes. Also there was a decrease in abnormal turnover of
the stocks with the most severe decrease incurred by non-voting
shares. Further, when measured by bid-ask spread, lower voting and
non-voting shares had an increase in spreads whereas multiple voting
shares had a reduction in the spread.73 The results suggest that
transparency is useful to investors but begs the question why
investors did not incorporate the status of the voting control of
stocks, which was available to them prior to the ticker change.
Finally, from a policy perspective there are many governance
issues which investors would incorporate in the security price absent
securities regulation. However, regulation has been introduced to
address these problems and dual-class shares and pyramids,
according to Morck and Yeung, should be no different.
This report presents a list of 12 recommendations that are designed
to establish a governance regulatory structure in which there is a
limitation on the scope of abuse by controlling shareholders who
have magnified power through the use of dual class and pyramid
71. S. Smart, T. Ramabhadran, S. Thirumalai and C. Zutter, "What's in a Vote? The
Short- and Long-Run Impact of Dual-Class Equity on iPo Firm Values" (2005)
Working Paper, University of Pittsburgh online: <http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract = 784722 >.
72. N. Attig, "Multiple Class Shares: The Information Content of Ticker Symbols"
(2007) Working Paper, Saint Mary's University [unpublished].
73. Attig, supra, footnote 68, at p. 6 (suggesting that this result may be the result of
"decreased likelihood of informed trading by holders of multiple voting shares").
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capital structures. Their recommendations are intended to avoid
banning dual class or pyramid structures since this would be difficult
and any change would have to incorporate a wealth transfer to the
controlling shareholders to compensate for the expropriation of their
voting power. The first nine recommendations apply to both dual
class and pyramid structures.
The tenth recommendation deals directly with the dual-class share
structure and states that "dual class share structures should reuire
periodic renewal by a majority of inferior voting shareholders."74 As
long as the controlling shareholders are operating the firm efficiently
they need not fear the vote since the firm value will not be negatively
affected by the structure and the controlling shareholders' plans are
viewed to create value. This recommendation is less invasive than that
introduced in Israel, in which there is a moratorium on new issues of
superior or inferior voting shares. Thus Israeli firms that intend to
raise new equity would have to unify their share structures. 75
Morck and Yeung have two recommendations regarding pyramid
structures. The first is to eliminate the ability to increase control by
purchasing small amounts of equity of various companies by
requiring any shareholder who acquires 30% or more of a listed
company to acquire 100%. This rule is found in the United Kingdom.
While this recommendation may be controversial, the second
recommendation goes even further. The recommendation is
"[flirms controlled by listed firms or via super voting shares should
be excluded from stock market indexes used by Index Funds." 76 The
purpose is to reduce the size of the investor base and to have the index
represent to outside investors that companies in the Canadian market
have good governance.
Morck and Yeung recognize that their recommendations are not
easy to implement and likely will be disliked by the principals of large
business groups and the owners of superior voting shares, individuals
who have influence in politics and commerce. However, they
recommend their reforms so as to put Canada on par with
governance as found in the United States and United Kingdom and
thereby improve Canadian capital markets.
74. Supra, footnote 49, at p. 338.
75. See S. Hauser and B. Lauterback, "The Value of Voting Rights to Majority
Shareholders: Evidence form Dual Class Stock Unifications" (2004), 17 The
Review of Financial Studies at pp. 1167-184 (noting that unifications raised
shareholder value, especially in family-controlled firms).
76. Supra, footnote 49, at p. 340.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Report provided a great deal of insight regarding the path that
Canada's road to modernize its securities legislation might take.
Much of its strength lay in its breadth of vision as well as in the
incredibly strong foundation of excellent research conducted by
researchers from around the world. This article has focused on
certain key topics that would be relevant to the increasingly
important retail investor. Those four key topics were enforcement,
rules vs. principles, financial literacy and disclosure, and dual class/
pyramid share structures.
With respect to enforcement of securities laws, the Task Force was
concerned about the "Canadian Discount" mentioned earlier and the
effect that the perception of Canadian enforcement may have had in
contributing to this. Research studies conducted by Bhattacharya
confirmed that countries with stricter enforcement of securities laws
have a lower cost of capital. The empirical study conducted by Howell
Jackson suggests that U.S. and Canadian funding and staffing levels
for securities enforcement may not be vastly different when adjusted
for economy and other variables. The Cory and Pilkington Paper
made many useful recommendations aimed at consolidating
securities regulation enforcement into an efficient, fair and just
process. These recommendations included expanding the scope and
power Of IMET as well as harmonizing and coordinating enforcement
efforts across various jurisdictions.
One critical point to note is that retail investors often lack the
financial resources or even the knowledge to access enforcement as a
form of either protection or compensation. The individual retail
investor, for example the investor who manages his/her own
retirement fund, is one particularly vulnerable category of person
upon whom the law and enforcement authorities should focus. While
the Task Force focused on making disclosure accessible to retail
investors, there was little mention of how enforcement efforts might
directly address the needs of retail investors. For now, the
recommendations that enforcement authorities be encouraged to
bring compensatory claims on behalf of aggrieved investors is a
potentially promising first step towards empowering an accessible
regime of private enforcement in tandem with public enforcement.
Although the topic of rules versus principles may seem at a
theoretical level, distanced from the everyday lives of retail investors,
the practical outcomes of this debate may have some significance
nevertheless to the retail investment sector. The approach adopted by
regulatory authorities can be expected to have some impact on
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enforcement activities and correspondingly may affect retail
investors through its overall structure, At a broad level, the
distinction between rules and principles is a theoretical one that
nevertheless has many practical consequences. Research from the
Task Force emphasized that most laws lay somewhere in the middle
of a spectrum between detailed and specific rules on the one hand and
general abstract principles on the other hand. Cunningham's
research revealed that public enforcers seemed to prefer rules-based
enforcement slightly while private professional body enforcers
seemed to heavily prefer principle-based enforcement. While there
is the perception that U.S. securities enforcement is rules-based while
Canadian securities enforcement is principles-based, the evidence
gathered by his research did support this assertion. These findings
suggest that the interplay between rules and principles is likely to be a
highly dynamic and complex one that does not lend itself well to
transplantation from other jurisdictions. Canada's path towards
securities regulation reform, whether it is through greater
harmonization or through a common securities regulator or even a
common enforcement body, may point towards a role for detailed
rules, though broad over-arching principles will still be required to
help in the interpretation of those rules. Similarly, rules-based laws
may be required for more serious transgressions under criminal law.
The extent to which rules and principles lay out a comprehensible
scheme of securities laws will be important to the retail investor. An
efficient system of enforcement is required for retail investor
protection and clearly comprehensible rules with principles that are
easily grasped by laypersons may prove to be an important factor in
the promotion and protection of the retail investor market.
The Task Force's analysis of the complex world of how retailer
investors make decisions is one that should be carefully heeded. The
empirical research conducted by Deaves sheds some very useful
insight into the world of the retail investor and brings it down to a very
practical level of how decisions are actually made, as opposed to the
perfectly rational, efficient markets paradigms that are often posited.
In the Deaves study, there was confirmation that retail investors
suffer from many behavioural biases and often make incorrect
decisions relating to diversification and asset allocation. This led the
Task Force to make key recommendations including improved
disclosure that balances plain language versus the cost and necessity
of full disclosure. Furthermore, it was recognized that the
improvement of financial literacy is relevant for Canadians
although there is evidence that increasing financial literacy may not
have as great an impact or benefit for retail investors as one might
2008]
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have thought. This is not to suggest that financial literacy education
be eliminated, only that it be focused at the appropriate base levels
first in a nationally coordinated scheme.
Morck and Yeung provide evidence from the academic literature
that dual class and pyramid share structures have negative
consequences for the economy and for capital markets. While
closely held shares have an entrenchment impact, it is the increasing
divergence between control rights and cash flow rights in dual class
and pyramid structures that generate the most concern. Further,
ongoing research in both Canada and the United States suggests that
these structures impact share liquidity, transparency of reporting,
earnings management and holdings by some institutional investors.
Fundamental change to remove dual-class shares or to eliminate
pyramids would be very difficult given the importance, either
economic or political, of these companies and families who control
them. Thus Morck and Yeung take a different route and make
recommendations intended to improve the governance of these
companies so as to reduce the economic impact and to provide a
better picture to foreign investors about Canadian capital markets.
Some of the recommendations are controversial and may go beyond
the boundaries of securities regulation.
Following the release of The Report, a few notable events have
taken place that should have an impact on the position and well-being
of the retail investor, directly and indirectly. The Ministry of Finance
released a document entitled "Advantage Canada," which
emphasized the role and importance of the capital markets in
enhancing the competitiveness of the Canadian economy. Nick Le
Pan was appointed a special advisor to review the structure and
governance of IMET. While not an issue that was within the direct
mandate of the Task Force, it is important to note that the Federal
Minister of Finance has also announced that he will be appointing a
special panel to review the structure of securities regulation in
Canada. In particular, the Task Force will be comparing the passport
model to a common regulator. The debate on a national or common
regulator has been going on for decades, but if we can address the
issues associated with provincial disempowerment in a reasonable
way, there may be a chance to turn the discussion into reality, for the
benefit of Canadian investors and issuers. There may be an
opportunity here to turn our Canadian discount into a Canadian
premium. All of these initiatives hold the promise of benefiting the
retail investor.
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